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Abstract: Pierre Bourdieu has claimed that his concept of the habitus resolves the 
objectivism/constructivism debate in the sociology of science.  While institutional 
norms require that scientists maintain a disinterested attitude, studies have revealed 
that scientists often fail to live up to the normative standard of disinterestedness, 
sometimes becoming highly tendentious to promote their own work.  Bourdieu 
resolves the interested/disinterested paradox by claiming that scientists promote their 
own personal interests through objective science.  This is supposed to be the 
consequence of the scientific habitus, which ensures that the biases of the scientific 
field remain invisible to scientists who operate within it.  The concept of the habitus is 
central to Bourdieu’s theory of science.  However, it has suffered from two major 
shortcomings: 1) the scientific field is made up of clusters of specializations which are 
shaped by interactions with each other, and the habitus does not account for these 
mesolevel interactions; 2) it can only account for reproduction of the scientific field 
and therefore ignores the mechanisms which produce change.  I argue that Karl 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge may be employed to better understand how the 
properties of scientific specialties both reproduce interested and disinterested 
behavior among scientists and facilitate change in particular specialty areas. 
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Pierre Bourdieu (1975, 2004) has claimed that his concept of the scientific habitus resolves the 
objectivism/constructivism debate in the sociology of science.  While institutional norms require that 
scientists maintain a disinterested attitude (Merton, 1968), empirical work in the sociology of sciencehas 
revealed that scientists often fail to live up to the normative standard of disinterestedness, sometimes 
becoming highly tendentious to promote their own work (Arthur, 2009; Frickel, 2004; Frickel & Gross, 
2005; Fuchs & Plass, 1999; Griffith & Mullins, 1972).  Bourdieu contends accepting the legitimacy of 
scientific knowledge at face value, and conceptualizing it as politics by other means, are two 
unsatisfactory options.  Clearly, the production of scientific knowledge is shaped more by political 
forces than positivistic accounts have acknowledged (e.g., Collins & Pinch, 1998).  Yet Bourdieu warns 
against throwing the baby out with the bathwater; it is equally misleading to overlook the role the 
disinterested scientific attitude plays in how scientists produce knowledge (Bourdieu, 1990).The 
commitment to disinterested, objective science, and the demonstrated role that interests play in the 
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construction of scientific facts (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1987) result in a paradox of 
motivation.Bourdieu resolves the interested/disinterested paradox by claiming that because 
disinterestedness is a regulatory norm, scientists promote their own personal interests through objective 
science.  Bourdieu points out that, in the scientific field, consumers of scientific products are also the 
producer’s rivals, and this rivalry is played out by constantly pushing one’s self, and one’s opponents, to 
better conform to scientific rationality (2004).  In this way scientists exhibit interested behavior while 
simultaneously adhering to the norm of disinterestedness. The theoretical advancement that is supposed 
to explain simultaneous interested and disinterested behavior is the scientific habitus, which ensures that 
the biases of the scientific field remain invisible to scientists who operate within it.  The habitus is a 
social-psychological framework for scientists to appraise new scientific developments that is based on 
communally agreed upon standards.  Because the habitus is a consequence of existing norms, it 
reproduces the scientific field by providing a template for behavior that is based on preexisting 
expectations (Bourdieu, 2004).   
Scientists pursue their own interests by subjecting their rivals to exacting standards of scientific 
rationality imposed by the habitus (Bourdieu, 2004).  Each new piece of information that is relevant to a 
scientist’s own career can be interpreted as corroborating or contradicting his or her own research 
program, and Bourdieu proposes that scientific rationality is a weapon used by scientists to neutralize 
scientists who make contradicting claims, and assimilate scientists who make corroborating claims.  But 
scientists involved may not necessarily be aware that they are using rationality in a partisan way; because 
disinterestedness is an integral element of scientific rationality, scientists can use it to pursue their own 
interests while simultaneously being committed to disinterestedness.  Bourdieu thus claims that a kind of 
positivistic scientific rationality plays a role in the accumulation of scientific knowledge, but also 
acknowledges that the scientific field is stratified by non-scientific factors (i.e., personal interests). The 
chasm between scholarship which assumes scientists engage in disinterestedness and that which 
characterizes science as politics by other meanshas traditionally been wide and that Bourdieu has been 
able to reconcile these views is a major achievement.  
The concept of the habitus is central to Bourdieu’s theory of science, but it suffers from some major 
shortcomings: Firstly, Bourdieu fails to account for an integral element of the structure of the scientific 
field:  specializations.  Scientific specialties are clusters of scientists who share common interests and 
who work toward common goals.  Specialties are one of the most salient elements of intellectual and 
professional identity among scientists (e.g., Griffith &Mullins, 1972; Mullins, 1972, 1973; Lermaine, 
MacLeod, Mulkay & Wiengart, 1976;Hargens, Mullins & Hecht,1980; Glaser, 2001; Frickel & Gross, 
2005), and so an account of the scientific habitus cannot overlook the effect participating in a specialty 
has on establishing the scientists’ interests.  Moreover, the habitus associated with a specialty is in part 
shaped by that specialty’s interaction with other specialties and other parties outside of the scientific field.  
Individual scientists do not compete for scientific capital as individuals alone; they do it in the context of 
the particular specializations in which they participate, and these specializations have a logic which 
shapes the scientific habitus at a higher level of analysis than practices involved with developing and 
carrying out individual research projects.  Bourdieu’s field theory of science would explain more if it 
could account for the properties of specialties and the way they interact with other groups.  
Another shortcoming of the habitus as applied to science is that it can only account for reproduction of 
the scientific field and therefore ignores the mechanisms that produce change. Bourdieu has often been 
accused of focusing too much on social reproduction and not enough on social change.  This criticism is 
especially relevant when applied to the scientific field, which has mechanisms designed to facilitate 
change built into its logic (i.e., organized skepticism; Merton, 1968).  If the habitus is to retain 
explanatory power in the field of science, it must account for changes in the scientific field. 
I will argue that Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge may be employed to better understand the 
relationship between scientific specialties and the scientific habitus.  I will also argue that Mannheim’s 
conceptualization of utopianism can help explain how the scientific habitus both reproduces the 
scientific field and simultaneously facilitates its evolution. Mannheim’s structural perspective and his 
analysis of the relationship between thought structures and group positions provide theoretical insights 
into Bourdieu’s field theory of science.  The key insights which Mannheim offers to Bourdieu’s field 
theory are that utopian thought is critical, ideological, and based on group positions. From this 
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Mannheimian perspective, the scientific habitus is shaped by the collective experiences of scientists 
within their own specialties, including interactions with other groups, both inside and outside of science.  
Moreover, the progressive orientation of scientific utopias ensures a scientific field which is not just 
reproduced, but in constant flux.  These insights will be applied to a well-known case study in the 
sociology of scientific specializations, Scott Frickel’s Chemical Consequences (2004).  In this book 
Frickel shows how genetic toxicologists came to define and redefine their own scientific field, and it  
serves as an example of how Mannheimian insights can be applied to Bourdieuian field theory.2 
 
BOURDIEU, FIELD THEORY, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENCE 
Bourdieu’s field theory is a general theory that has been used to explain myriad social phenomena.  The 
three core concepts in Bourdieu’s field theory are “field”, “habitus”, and “symbolic capital” ( Bourdieu, 
1977).  The field represents all individuals within a more or less autonomous social world who have 
interests and compete for resources, in particular symbolic capital.  Each field has its own logic (what 
Bourdieu calls “specificity”) that is determined by the regularities of behaviors of the individuals who 
participate in the field.  Conditions for entry into a field are competence (the ability recognize, react to, 
and ultimately internalize the regularities of the field) and belief (basic properties of the field will not be 
questioned; this secures the autonomy of the field) (Bourdieu, 2004).  The idea of a “field”, a metaphor 
taken form physics, is that diffuse “forces” surrounding an object have the capability of changing that 
object.  A field is “the local social world in which actors are embedded and toward which they orient 
their actions” (Sallaz and Zavisca, 2007: 24). In his review of field theory, Martin explains, “In the social 
sciences, the field serves as some sort of representation for those overarching social regularities that may 
also be visualized (by competing theoretical orientations) as quasi-organisms, systems, or structures” 
(2003: 8).  Individuals in a field share a relationship to each other through a shared logic, goals, and 
recognized forms of legitimate compensation and reward.  Fields have “rules for how to play, stakes or 
forms of value (i.e., capital), and strategies for playing the game. In the process of playing, participants 
become invested in and absorbed by the game itself” (Martin, 2003:24).  While the struggle for resources 
is a “game” with “rules”, the concept of “rules” in a field refers to the patterned behaviors of the actors 
within it who choose the behaviors which bring the most rewards, not formal decrees.  A field is 
comprised of“a set of assumptions always vulnerable to deliberate upset via surprise” (Martin, 2003: 32); 
that is, the rules can be broken. More technically, when the field changes in such a way that the old 
patterns of behavior are no longer profitable, actors will adjust their behavior accordingly and the 
patterns will change, bringing about new “rules of the game”.  
The most important reward at stake in a field is symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is a universally 
agreed upon reward or item of value relevant to a field.  Anything can serve as symbolic capital if people 
recognize its unequal distribution as legitimate (Bourdieu, 1991: 118).  In the labor market symbolic 
capital may refer dirtiness/cleanliness of a job or the flexibility of the work schedule; in science symbolic 
capital may refer to publications in elite journals or access to elite methods or equipment.  By 
emphasizing the importance of symbolic capital Bourdieu does not deny the importance of material 
conditions, but argues that all rewards, including material, will flow to those who have the symbolic 
authority to possess them.   
In Bourdieu’s field theory the regularities that constitute a field become internalized by the individuals, 
and the structure of thought is shaped by these external forces.  This internalization of social structure is 
termed the habitus.  The habitus is defined by Bourdieu as a set of “durable, transposable dispositions” 
(1991: 53).  It “is less a set of conscious strategies and preferences than an embodied sense of the world 
and one’s place within it—a tacit ‘feel for the game’” (Sallaz and Zavisca, 2007: 25). The habitus is 
theoretically useful because it is a social-psychological concept which accounts for the reproduction of 
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social structure. The habitus is best thought of as a kind of coupling connecting the individual to the logic 
of the field.  It determines the structure of an individual’s consciousness in such a way that resources 
required from the individual to maintain social structure, and the rewards the social structure delivers to 
the individual for cooperation, may be exchanged with the least amount of disruption, to the point that an 
individual’s habitus goes largely unnoticed by the individual until the field’s autonomy is threatened by 
external powers (Bourdieu, 1977).  Consequently, the habitus enables the social structure of the field to 
be reproduced, at the same time that the field determines the shape of the habitus.   
Bourdieu applied his brand of field theory to many areas of social life, including the scientific field.  In 
the field of science, symbolic capital derives from access to and skill in the most prestigious objects, 
methods, theories, and equipment.  The “rules of the game” are shaped by the strategies scientists need to 
have to secure this scientific capital (including securing the right mentors and colleagues, learning the 
right methods, using a specific kind of technical language, etc.), and the scientific habitus determines 
which kinds of scientific problems are the most important, and what will be taken for granted.  The 
scientific habitus is supposed to reproduce structures of power within the scientific field by setting 
priorities which benefit those who already have disproportionate access to scientific capital (Bourdieu, 
1975, 1988, 2004). 
Bourdieu claims that his concept of the habitus resolves the objectivism/constructivism debate in the 
sociology of science.  He points out that, in the scientific field, “producers tend to have as their clients 
only their most rigorous and vigorous competitors, the most competent and the most critical, those 
therefore most inclined and most able to give their critique full force” (2004: 54), and this rivalry is 
played out by constantly pushing one’s self, and one’s opponents, to better conform to scientific 
rationality.  In this way scientists exhibit interested behavior while simultaneously adhering to the norm 
of disinterestedness. The solution he offers is, essentially, that being “objective” is part of the “rules of 
the game” in the scientific field, and so scientists actively try to play the disinterested part, though 
because of their habitus that “objectivity” is biased in a direction which reflects their interests.  Therefore, 
scientists can be objective while simultaneously being biased; their strategies are inseparably social and 
scientific.“It follows”, Bourdieu argues, “from a rigorous definition of the scientific field as the objective 
space defined by the play of opposing forces in a struggle for scientific stakes, that it is pointless to 
distinguish between strictly scientific determinations and strictly social determinations of practices that 
are essentially overdetermined” (1975: 21).That is, the logic of the scientific fieldengenders a habitus 
which motivates scientists to adopt norms of scientific objectivity, but at the same time biases standards 
of objectivity toward the individual interests stemming from participating in a certain place in the field.  
Scientists are committed to a particular way of doing science, and attempt to produce objective, scientific 
results within the limits of their habitus. 
Despite the utility of the concept of the habitus in science, Bourdieu’s discussion of how the habitus is 
constructed from experiences in the field is limited.  The scientific habitus is treated as a universal 
construct governing the relationship between the logic of the scientific field and individual scientists, but 
little attention is given to how scientific expectations dictated by specific research specialties produce 
the habitus.  Bourdieu’s major empirical research on scientific capital, published as Home Academicus 
(1988), compares only broad disciplinary orientations (law, medicine, science, and the arts) within 
academia, and fails to examine specific research programs and how they shape the positions and 
dispositions of the scientists who work within them. The scientific habitus is supposed to reflect a 
relationship between individual scientists (the habitus is essentially a social-psychological concept) and 
the organization of the scientific field as a whole, but Bourdieu pays little attention to the mesolevel 
aspects of scientific organization which play a major role in shaping scientists’ professional experiences 
and identities.  Scientists form groups which are at a lower level of analysis than the field as a whole, but 
which play a part in what they will consider to be important, and what they will be likely to overlook.   
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s field theory has been attacked on the grounds that the habitus only accounts 
for reproduction of the field and cannot account for change (e.g., Gartman, 1991, Alexander, 1995, 
Griswold. 1998).  Critics argue that” the interlocking concepts of field, capital, and habitus depict an 
airtight system in which structures produce individuals who in turn reproduce structures” (Sallaz and 
Zavisca, 2007: 25).  Bourdieu has responded by citing changes in particular fields, such as revolutionary 
Algeria, where the everyday world can no longer be taken for granted. Situations such as these create 
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“space for symbolic strategies aimed at exploiting the discrepancies between the nominal and the real” 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 481).  But events such as the drastic reorganization of society are rare, and do not 
account for changes in fields outside of such contexts.  In cases such as political revolutions, Bourdieu’s 
field theory does not so much explain changes in the field as is does excuse itself from extraneous 
circumstances. 
The remainder of this paper will be given over to addressing these shortcomings in Bourdieu’s field 
theory of science.  Although it is seldom acknowledged, Karl Mannheim and Pierre Bourdieu share 
fundamental views on the relation between social position and knowledge, and I will argue that 
Bourdieu’s field theory can be enriched when a Mannheimian analysis of group positions is taken.   
 
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY, AND UTOPIA 
With the publication of the original German edition of Ideology and Utopia in 1929, Karl Mannheim 
grew to be an influential social theorist within the German speaking world.  Mannheim’s contribution 
was to redefine how thinking and knowledge were to be considered in reference to social structure.  
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge argues that styles of thought are a consequence of lived conditions, 
that lived conditions are organized according to sociological categories, and that each sociological 
category’s style of thought is shaped by interactions with others (1936).  Knowledge, he argues, “is from 
the very beginning a co-operative process of group life, in which everyone unfolds his knowledge within 
the framework of a common fate, a common activity, and the overcoming of common difficulties (in 
which, however, each has a different share)” (1936: 29).  The Mannheimian sociology of knowledge 
specifies that the “individual is born into a world where political and social ideas are already preformed 
into patterns and have a structure which is independent of the individual” (Turner, 1995: 721), and thus 
the individual takes on the characteristics of thought which are a consequence of the group outlook 
within which he is situated.  From this perspective, the unique experiences of particular groups give rise 
to corresponding modes of thinking. 
These modes of thought simultaneously exist among other modes of thought stemming from other 
social groups.  One characteristic feature of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is its reliance on 
structural analysis:  the style of thought corresponding to a particular group cannot be understood 
without reference to the ideas of other social groups with which it interacts.  Groups “do not confront the 
objects of the world . . . as solitary beings.  On the contrary they act with and against one other in 
diversely organized groups, and while doing so they think with and against one another” (Mannheim, 
1936: 4). This structural relationship between modes of thought stemming from the concrete experiences 
of different social groups results in competition over what Mannheim calls “the correct social diagnosis” 
(1952: 196); different groups compete for control over what counts as the proper perspective on the 
social condition. 
These modes of thought, however, do not arise arbitrarily from social conditions but tend to reflect the 
various interests of the groups from which they spring.  The ideas flowing from a particular group tend to 
justify the interests of that group, and so contain an element of incongruence with the structure of the 
intellectual field as a whole.  In this sense, ideas become ideologies which imperfectly reflect reality.  
Mannheim builds on Marx’s critique of bourgeois ideology, in which Marx had identified political 
liberalism as a justification for capitalist relations of production.  He acknowledges the significance of 
Marx’s insight, crediting him as the first to give systematic attention to how ideas are a reflection of lived 
conditions (Mannheim, 1936: 72-5).  However, Mannheim faults Marx for claiming to attack liberalism 
from a politically neutral position.  Marxism, Mannheim argues, is no less an ideology than liberalism, 
even if it represents the conditions of a different class of people.  To Mannheim, ideologies cannot be 
avoided because they are the intellectual dimension of lived experience. 
Mannheim’s theory of ideology considers several levels of ideological consciousness.  An awareness 
of a particular ideology corresponds to the realization that an individual opponent is making use of 
biased ideas to justify interests.  Total ideology shifts the focus to the collective, exposing the biases of 
thought in the ideas of whole social groups.  Those who make use of the special form of the total 
conception of ideology only expose as ideological those ideas which correspond to groups other than 
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one’s own; Mannheim locates orthodox Marxism here.  Finally, the general form of the total conception 
of ideology subjects all points of view, including the analyst’s, to sociological analysis (see Mannheim, 
1936:Ch.2).  According to Mannheim, the general form of the total conception of ideology is the proper 
domain of the sociology of knowledge because it treats all ideas as emerging from concrete existence, 
and so it gives special privilege to none.  From the Mannheimian perspective, ideology loses its negative 
connotation and becomes a constitutive element of social life, a necessary consequence of existence.  
Because each particular group is situated in a unique position relative to the entire intellectual landscape 
it can only formulate ideas consistent with that position, and so ideology is merely a way of making 
sense of the world within the limits imposed by social structure.  This is what Rayner has referred to as 
the “neutral” conception of ideology which “dispenses with the idea that ideology is parasitic upon 
existing disciplines such as history or science and can be understood negatively as a simple falling-away 
from well-understood standards of truth or rationality” (1989: 375).  Ideology, then, is incongruence, but 
one which cannot be separated from concrete existence. 
In defining ideology as incongruence between ideas and reality, Mannheim includes utopianism as a 
special kind of ideology that is directed at social change.  Ricoeur has recognized the significance of this 
synthesis, noting that Mannheim “was perhaps the initial person to link ideology and utopia together 
under the general problematic of noncongruence [sic]” (1986:159).  The difference between ideology 
and utopia, however, may be found in their differing political aims:  ideologies justify and perpetuate 
extant social arrangements, while utopias “tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things 
prevailing at the time” (Mannheim, 1936: 192).  Both ideologies and utopias are incomplete 
interpretations groups make of a larger intellectual landscape of which they have only a partial view.  
The difference is thatideologies function to maintain social stability while utopias press for social change.  
Mannheim executes a slight redefinition of the term which was coined by Thomas More in 1516. To 
Mannheim, utopian thought is not confined to stories of places that are “no place” but encompasses all 
forms of thought which intend to alter social relationships as they stand.3 He “goes out of his way to 
reject the popular meaning of utopia as wish fulfillment, or a hope or dream that is in principle 
unrealizable” (Kumar,2006: 173).  Instead of utopias being defined as unrealizable, Mannheim insists 
that they are the vehicles of social change, the modes of thought which work to discredit the ideologies 
which legitimate the status quo.  Utopias are “those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed 
form the unrealized and the unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age.  These 
intellectual elements then become the explosive material for bursting the limits of the existing order” 
(Mannheim, 1936: 199).  Because utopian thought is defined by Mannheim as a program for altering 
existing conditions, utopianism is inseparable from purposeful change; it is the very embodiment of it.  
As such, it is a primary component of a dynamic society.  Ricoeur summarizes Mannheim’s position: 
If we could imagine a society where everything is realized, there congruence would exist.  The 
society, however, would also be dead, because there would be no distance, no ideals, no 
project at all.  Mannheim fights against those who claim – and herald – that we are now living 
in the time of the death of ideology and utopia.  The suppression of noncongruence, the 
suppression of the disconnection between ideals and reality, would be the death of society 
(1986: 180). 
 
However, as a form of incongruence, utopias suffer the same shortcomings as ideologies.  Because, 
like all ideologies, they are espoused by social groups who may only think within the bounds which their 
social structural position permits them to, utopias fail to grasp the total social landscape, and are always 
responses to perspectives which only partially grasp reality. Mannheim argues that utopian groups “are 
intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given society that they 
unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it.  Their thinking is incapable 
of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society” (1936: 40).  And so utopian modes of thought 
tend to treat as factual only those elements of reality that are congruous with its own perspective.  This is 
what Roy Jacques has called “crypto-utopia,” or a brand of utopianism which fails to acknowledge the 
situatedness of its claims; it is “a form of idealized vision of the world that pretends not to be a vision at 
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all” (Jacques, 2002: 31). 
As Mannheim repeatedly emphasizes, the incongruence between ideas and reality need not take the 
form of a conscious deception.  At the heart of Mannheim’s structural analysis of group positions lies his 
conviction that any particular group cannot develop a worldview which incorporates the perspectives of 
all other groups.  This is because modes of thought are informed by concrete existence, and different 
groups are existentially disparate.  While purposeful deception may of course be employed to further 
interests, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge states that chicanery is only incidental to ideologies.  It is 
the disparate experiences of different social groups which ensure that a comprehensive view of reality is 
not attainable, and so members of such groups may act in accordance with their particular ideologies and 
all the while respond to nothing more than the facts as they see them.   
Mannheim views political utopias as evolving as the prevailing social cleavages shift throughout 
history. In his particular historical schema outlined in Ideology and Utopia (1936; the page numbers 
cited below refer to this book) there have been four major political utopias: orgiastic chiliam, liberal 
humanitarianism, conservatism, and socialism/communism. Orgiastic chiliasm, an Anabaptist tradition 
founded by the early Reformation-era theologian Thomas Munzer, is characterized by absolute 
presentness. “For the real Chiliast, the present becomes the breach through which what was previously 
inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and transforms it” (p.215).  As an aspatial, 
atemporal utopia, in which the here-and-now is elevated to ecstasy through spiritual means, it anticipates 
absolute bliss to break from the situation at any moment.  This type of untopianism, Mannheim argues, 
stems from the conditions of the medieval peasant, who is unfamiliar with organized political revolution 
and therefore cannot envision a utopian world, but can merely wish for a miraculous alleviation of 
suffering at any moment.   
Liberal humanitarianism’s utopia, however, is characterized by the “idea”, or an idealized set of 
circumstances (generally organized around political and economic freedom) which political action must 
always strive toward.  In this sense, liberal humanitarianism takes a much more temporal orientation to 
utopia, in that it can only be totally achieved sometime in the distant future.  The liberal humanitarian 
utopia is associated by Mannheim with the ascending bourgeoisie during the Enlightenment, who took 
an evolving view of the improvement of political relations as a justification for abolition of the Ancién 
Régime of both monarchy and religion, and for capitalism’s nascent but undeniable advance, which 
posed an obvious threat to the old order and was tightly bound up with the idea of progress.   
Conservatism is argued to be a reaction to threats to the existing order made by utopian movements.  
As a reaction, conservatives construct counter-utopias, in which extant social relations are glorified, 
magnified, and made into a set of ideal standards by which to judge the extent of their actual application.  
Like liberal humanitarians, conservatives maintain a temporal orientation to utopianism, but also make 
use of the past and not the future.  If what “is” is right, then there develops an appreciation for how things 
developed into the state that they are in, and the past and present are thus united and naturalized into an 
unassailable front against social change.  Conservatism is supposed to be a characteristic of the Ancién 
Régime, which maintained an interest in preserving the status quo.   
The last utopia Mannheim considers, the socialist/communist, is an invention of the modern 
proletariat and, unlike the liberal humanitarians who celebrated the “idea”, see the determinants of the 
ideal society in its material conditions.  Consequently, socialist/communists (Mannheim declares that for 
his purposes there is no reason to distinguish between the two) see the installation of their ideals, not in 
an infinite future, but “at a much more specifically determined point in time, namely the period of the 
breakdown of capitalist culture” (p.240).  In common with liberal humanitarianism, 
socialist/communists are temporally oriented toward the future, but Mannheim observes that the latter 
make use of a distinction between the near and distant future, as a means of justifying short-term tactics 
that are only indirectly related to their lofty long-term goals. 
There is much to quarrel with in Mannheim’s analysis of utopian thought.4  (Are these really the 
dominant trends in utopian thought?  Are they merely caricatures of much more complicated 
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Stehr 1990. 
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worldviews?)  I will not digress into a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Mannheim’s 
account of the aforementioned groups of utopists.  The important points are these:  Mannheim identified 
differing structures of thought corresponding to differing positions in the social structure; the group 
position determined the content of the utopia; these structures of thought were to some extent 
incommensurable, in that the group position defined what counted as a reasonable worldview; each 
stream of utopian thought must interact and compete with the others in the overall intellectual field.   
 
MUNDANE UTOPIANISM 
The utility of Mannheim’s conception of utopianism is that it shows how group life determines the way 
in which people view the world, and how it motivates people to change the world in the interests of their 
own group.  While utopias had previously been restricted to literary fictions, Mannheim recognized the 
significance of utopias for social structure in real life.  Mannheim’s concept of real utopias has drawn 
attention to the ways in which utopianism informs social life.  Utopianism has been defined as “The 
conceptualization and the visualization of change . . . [it] is the precondition of actualized social change” 
(Polack, 1965: 282).  It is “the sober, rational, and realistic evaluation of . . . an alternative, credibly better, 
and historically possible (but far from certain) future” (Wallerstein1998: 1-2). 
The idea of utopian ideology can be extended to other fields than the political. While Mannheim’s 
concern with creating an historical sociology caused him to focus primarily on big problems of politics 
and culture in history, Mannheimian utopianism is a portable idea and can be applied more narrowly if 
required.  Utopianism which falls short of radical restructuring of social relations we might call 
“mundane” utopianism.  Knights and Willmott (2002) argue that the key to understanding the social 
functions of utopianism is the study of mundane utopias.  Because grandiose utopias restructure social 
relations so extensively, utopias and dystopias “are often difficult to distinguish, as one person’s vision 
of virtue is another’s view of vice.  Instead . . . it is relevant to give attention to practical, mundane 
utopian efforts – efforts that are so often taken for granted as to be almost unrecognizable as utopian in 
inspiration” (Knights and Willmott, 2002: 59).  Mundane utopias reveal the deep potency of Mannheim’s 
insights.  His claims about the nature of ideologies and utopias reflect more than the major intellectual 
fault lines in a historical period; they speak to the very actions of thinking and planning in any situation.   
 
UTOPIANISM IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD 
Like the social world in general, the field of scientific activity is clustered into discernable groups.  
These groups specialize in different lines of research, and through the various mechanisms of 
institutionalization (e.g., specialty journals, conferences, professional societies, and university 
departments) the scientists in each specialty reach more or less a consensus about appropriate methods, 
problems, and objects of study.  This consensus concerning appropriate professional activities ensures 
that members of a specialty share a set of concrete experiences, both physical and intellectual.  Sharing 
these experiences, members of a specialty develop a particular worldview about the work they do.  This 
worldview includes perspectives on what counts as good science and how that science will be used to 
direct the specialty as it progresses into the future. Böhme (1975: 220) observes that the 
acknowledgement of methodological rules and paradigms in a specialty generates solidarity among 
scientists. The solidarity and sense of community which are a natural consequence of the great number of 
scientific specialty areas mean that science, as a whole, is characterized by an array of locally specific 
worldviews, many of which share a great deal of overlap, and many of which are practically 
incommensurable.  
Scholarship – including but not limited to empirical science – is unique among social institutions 
because of the emphasis placed on making use of the past and the future in an explicit and formal way.  
For a scientific contribution to be relevant, it must build upon research already carried out in the past, and 
simultaneously make a contribution to popularly held ideas about where research in a specialty area 
should be going in the future.  What are the next steps towards understanding a problem?  What are the 
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next questions that need to be asked?  How should we go about answering them?  What other groups 
should be listening to us and why? Questions such as these are an integral element of any vital specialty, 
and they call for scientists to take actions which may have direct consequences for the organization of the 
scientific field.   As Tillich(1965: 302) observes, utopianism functions by drawing upon the past to 
project an idealized future as the basis for action in the present.  Science envisions future progress and 
consciously moves toward progress, yet it never reaches a destination.  The horizon is always moving.  
The nature of scientific vision is to anticipate that all of the specialty’s major problems can be solved 
while simultaneously never running out of major problems.  Intellectual stagnation is considered a 
failure rather than an accomplishment.5The impossibility of total cognitive accomplishment in the future 
meets the possibilities embodied in accomplishments of the past in a utopistic present which 
incorporates elements of both.  The utopian vision of scientific progress impels scientists to take actions 
which have consequences for the way the scientific field is organized. Because scientific worldviews 
correspond differ between specialty areas, scientific utopianism is the formulation of particular utopias 
corresponding to particular specialties. 
When the scientific field is viewed as a multiplicity of clusters corresponding to specialties and each 
specialty corresponds to its own unique set of experiences, its future planning is utopistic, and like all 
utopias, it cannot account for the total reality, but only the reality which corresponds to its experiences.  
As such, scientists involved in utopian specialization treat the specialty’s own problems, methods, and 
objects of study as if they are of capital importance to the realm of knowledge in general, despite being of 
marginal significance to all but a few scientists who constitute the specialty.  Because each specialty has 
its own set of priorities corresponding to its own experiences, and these priorities both overlap with and 
contradict the priorities of other specialties and other parties outside of the scientific field, specialized 
research programs and the habitus they create cannot be understood without an analysis of these 
relationships. 
Mannheim enriches Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus by suggesting that the logic of the interactions 
of different groups (e.g., the “rules of the game” which govern the interactions scientific specialties have 
with other groups) need to be treated separately from the logic of the field corresponding to a particular 
group (e.g., the “rules of the game” which set the standard for research within a specialty) when 
considering the formation of the of the habitus. A Mannheimian analysis of the scientific field would 
focus on scientific specialties, their particular worldviews and how those worldviews are shaped by 
interactions with other parties.  In order to explain what scientists take for granted, we need to describe 
the worldview of their specialty, and utilizing Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge can be used to 
understand specialties’ worldviews. 
 
SCIENTIFIC UTOPIAS AND CHANGE IN THE SCIENTIFIC 
FIELD 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge also provides an explanation of how the habitus facilitates change 
within the scientific field. Fields are supposed to contain a mechanism (the habitus) which ensures that 
the basic properties of the field will be reproduced, but fields do change, and the theoretical model 
proposed by Bourdieu performs poorly when attempting to account for change.  He does propose that 
“subversion strategies” (Bourdieu, 1975) can threaten to upset the logic of a field, but his field theory 
does not include a systematic mechanism that drives change.6 The Mannheimian idea of utopianism as a 
change-oriented group-based ideology can be applied within a Bourdieuian theoretical framework, and 
                                                        
5 See, for example, Smolin’s (2006) discussion of the standard model of quantum mechanics.  Smolin, a renowned 
physical theorist, laments the fact that the standard model has not been significantly altered in thirty years.  Rather 
than taking this stagnation as an indication of its adequacy, he rebukes the physics community for not improving 
upon it.   
6 To Bourdieu, subversion strategies are risky, winner-take-all strategies which explicitly threaten to devalue the 
reigning form of scientific capital. While subversion strategies are an attempt to account for scientific change, they 
play a small part in Bourdieu’s theory, and he in fact argues that science has become so reified that true subversion is 
no longer possible (Bourdieu, 1975). 
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doing so helps explain how scientific fields change despite the conservative effects of the habitus.  
Utopianism implies that the members of a sociological group formulate a vision of a more perfect world 
based on their group position, and then purposefully act towards the fulfillment of that vision.  From the 
utopian perspective, changes in the structure of a scientific specialty’s specific field are a consequence of 
the guiding and motivational elements of the utopia, which call for (and actually produce) constant 
reconfigurations in a specialty’s paradigm.   
The balance of scientific capital and the actual content of the habitus reflect the state of a science as it 
exists in the field at any given time. However, the group ideology associated with a scientific specialty 
includes expectations about how new research should change the science in the future; this is the utopian 
aspect of the group position: based on the experiences of the scientists that make up a particular specialty, 
a certain set of activities is recommended for the purpose of changing the state of knowledge in that 
specialty for the better. Because the structure of a field automatically advantages those with 
disproportionate accessto scientific capital, new contributions to a scientific paradigm are typically 
conservative and reflect extant professional power structures.  But the exploratory nature of the scientific 
enterprise ensures that not all contributions will reproduce the field faithfully; every new contribution to 
a scientific paradigm is potentially subversive to the existing structure of the field. Unexpected findings 
can be ignored, assimilated, or become the basis of a challenge to accepted scientific truths.  As these 
contributions accumulate, they require reinterpretations of existing data, theories, methods, etc., and thus 
the objects that make up the scientific habitus are inherently unstable.  Changes in a scientific field then 
result from: a) the group positions which determine what kinds of research and professional activities 
will be valued; b) the utopian visions which are a consequence of those positions; c) the activities which 
attempt to fulfill the utopian vision, and; 4) the inability of the field to assimilate new contributions in 
such a way that the structure of a field is faithfully reproduced. If a scientific habitus is a set of 
taken-for-granted dispositions regarding appropriate theories, methods, data, and assumptions, then the 
actual content of a habitus will reflect the state of a specialty area of science as it actually exists at a given 
time.  When it is recognized that contributions to a specialty area can change the state of a science, then 
they must be allowed to change the structure of the field and the habitus as well. 
This theory of dynamism within scientific fields is more nuanced than another theory of scientific 
change: that of Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) scientific revolutions.  For Kuhn, contributions to an existing 
paradigm could only be conservative: real change and real scientific progress only occur when 
discoveries prompt the total rejection of an old paradigm in favor of a new one.  Bourdieuian field theory, 
on the other hand, calls for a more detailed analysis of how smaller changes within the state of a science 
provide occasions for a shift in what kinds of things scientists take for granted.  Certainly the great 
scientific revolutions, such as the Copernican Revolution, usher in radical changes in how scientific 
fields are organized.  But the contributions which Kuhn described as “normal” conservative additions to 
a reigning paradigm may in fact have profound influences the structure of the field, even if they do not 
qualify as wholesale rejections. This position is corroborated by Mullins (1975), who observed that 
scientific revolutions seem much less “revolutionary” to the scientists who actively work within them 
because they are privy to the incremental changes that eventually bring about major intellectual 
reorganizations.  Major changes in the scientific field seem much more pronounced to those who only 
pay attention to them after they have happened.  But by then, the intellectual currency has already shifted.  
“Revolutions” are often better thought of as a series of “normal” contributions which take the science in 
a new direction rather than a sudden and wholesale replacement of one paradigm by another (See also 
Wray 2005). Because a specialty’s utopian vision engenders a scientific field which is in constant flux, 
there are constantly new opportunities for the reorganization of scientific capital.  
 
SCOTT FRICKEL’S CHEMICAL CONSEQUENCES: GROUP 
POSITION AND HABITUS IN GENETIC TOXICOLOGY 
In this section I will apply my argumentsto Scott Frickel’s Chemical Consequences: Environmental 
Mutagens, Scientist Activism, and the Rise of Genetic Toxicology (2004). Frickel’s work is relevant 
because it empirically examines how a scientific specialty comes to understand itself and the work it 
Richard M. Simon /Studies in Sociology of Science Vol.2 No.1, 2011 
  32
does with reference to other scientific specialties and political movements.   
Frickel examines the rise, and eventual institutionalization of genetic toxicology. Genetic 
toxicologyrefers to the study of how exposure to chemicals causes mutations in genes. Genetic mutations 
have long been of interest to scientists interested in understanding basic genetic processes.  Studying 
what goes wrong in genetic transmission has helped scientists to understand how basic genetic 
transmission processes work.  One problem with studying mutations is that without human interference 
they are rare.  Before the use of radiation in mutation studies scientists compensated for the rarity of 
mutations by breeding large quantities of quickly-reproducing animals, specifically, fruit flies 
(Drosophila melanogaster).  However, in 1927 it was discovered that exposure to radiation could induce 
mutations at a much higher rate than that which occurred naturally.  This discovery greatly improved the 
efficiency and the accessibility of mutation research.  Before the use of radiation, mutation research was 
only available to those with access to Drosophilia “breeder reactors” (Frickel, 2004: 24); now anyone 
with a handful of flies and an x-ray machine could produce mutants.  Radiation mutagenesis became a 
significant specialization within genetic science. 
Meanwhile, during the Second World War, British scientists Charlotte Auerbach and J. M. Robson 
were studying the physiological effects of the mustard gas that was being used as a biological weapon by 
both the allies and the axis powers.  During the course of their research Auerbach and Robson discovered 
that exposure to mustard gas could produce mutations at rates similar to the use of radiation (Frickel, 
2004: 27-8).  This discovery prompted others to investigate the effects of a variety of chemicals on 
mutagenesis.  
While the discovery that chemicals could produce mutations garnered much curiosity, the practice was 
still intellectually and professionally tied to radiation mutagenesis because the two methodologies 
served essentially the same scientific purpose:  producing mutations for the study of basic genetic 
processes.  Radiation could be produced easily and cheaply and so there was little incentive to pursue 
chemical mutagenesis.  But the study of chemical mutagenesis was soon to receive a new impetus.  
During the 1960s the environmental movement began to receive national attention.  Spokespersons of 
this movement warned that pollution and degradation of the environment could have deleterious 
consequences for mankind.  Publications such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) ignited popular 
concern about the effects of chemicals in the environment.  Some of the key scientists involved with 
research on chemical mutagenesis, notably Alexander Hollaender and James Crow, took notice. Crow’s 
widely read article in Scientist and Citizen (1968) warned that exposure to toxic chemicals could 
adversely affect the human gene pool, pointing to research on chemical mutagenesis as evidence.  
Eventually, concern for the effects of toxic chemicals in the environment on humans became the primary 
justification for funding and carrying out research on chemical mutagenesis.  Soon “chemical 
mutagenesis” was renamed “genetic toxicology”, reflecting the new interest in exposure to toxic 
chemicals. Genetic toxicology became a research specialty intellectually and professionally distinct 
from radiation mutagenesis by virtue of its concern with what Frickel calls the “genetic hazards” (2004: 
84) problem. 
Genetic toxicology’s relationship to the environmental movement produced a particular set of 
dispositions among scientists in this specialty area.  Genetic toxicologists came to view themselves as 
important players in the fight against environmental degradation, accepting and expanding Crow’s 
interpretation of the relevance of chemical mutagenesis research.  Genetic toxicology developed a new 
habitus corresponding to its own methodology and new justification.  To the scientists practicing and 
proselytizing for genetic toxicology, it was assumed to be a solution to myriad health, scientific, and 
political, and economic issues.  The research performed by genetic toxicologists provided insights into 
the possible consequences of the reckless use of toxic chemicals, and these insights coalesced into a 
cognitive framework with which to view politics, industry, and other areas of science.  Proselytizers of 
genetic toxicology, such as Sam Epstein, tailored its research program to overlap with problems 
associated with research on cancer and birth defects.  The “genetic hazards” frame determined what 
genetic toxicologists would consider relevant, what they would take for granted, and what they would 
consider to be appropriate courses of action; it provided an impetus to change the existing state of 
knowledge by creating a research program around the genetic effects of toxic chemicals.  And by 
changing the existing state of knowledge, it altered the “rules of the game” and the type of symbolic 
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capital of value to genetic toxicologists.  While genetic toxicology had previously been defined in 
reference to basic genetic science and radiation genetics, its new relationship to the environmental 
movement changed its research program and also its relationships with other specialties. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to understand the history of genetic toxicology and the “genetic hazards” frame without 
understanding the relationship of genetic toxicology to other groups, both within the scientific field and 
those that are not directly involved in scientific research.  Chemical mutagenesis began as an offshoot of 
radiation genetics and at this time scientists practicing chemical mutagenesis defined their work with 
reference to the goals and methods of radiation genetics.  Chemical mutagenesis research was pursued 
and evaluated with reference to its relevance to basic questions that concerned geneticists.  The issues 
defined as relevant and non-relevant in chemical mutagenesis science were a consequence of the 
relationship this specialty had to radiation genetics and basic biology. The chemical mutagenesis 
worldview wasone that reflected its affiliation with these groups.  As the political economy of science 
evolved, and the relationships between parties shifted, so too did the habitus associated with chemical 
mutagenesis.  A politically influential environmental movement emerged which established an explicit 
relationship to scientific research.  Chemical mutagenesis became an integral element of this relationship, 
and its habitus was altered in the process.  As chemical mutagenesis became genetic toxicology, the 
“genetic hazards” frame was in part defined by the relationship of genetic toxicology to other sciences.  
Genetic toxicology was framed as necessary to cancer research and scientists concerned with birth 
defects.  In this way, its habitus was constructed not just by a relationship to the environmental 
movement, but to other scientific specialties as well.  Champions of genetic toxicology spent much time 
and energy proselytizing its message to other scientists, and this process helped define what genetic 
toxicology is and why it is important.  Different specialties and exogenous parties with an interest in 
science all fight for the “correct” diagnosis of the scientific field from the particular positions from 
which they view it.  This is a Mannheimian insight that enriches a Bourdieuian analysis of Chemical 
Consequences. 
Frickel’s study of genetic toxicology suggests that its habitus contains utopian elements in the 
Mannheimian sense.  The defining elements of utopian thought are: 1) utopias are a consequence of 
group position; 2) utopias are incongruent with the total intellectual landscape; 3) utopias are progressive, 
or change oriented.  I have already explained how genetic toxicology’s habitus was shaped by its 
relationship to other parties, but what about incongruence?  Genetic toxicology seemed to be addressing 
the concerns of the groups it shared relationships with.  All parties seemed to agree on the importance of 
studying the effects of toxic chemicals on humans. Genetic toxicologists’ habitus suggested which issues 
were of the most importance, but because the habitus of genetic toxicology is incongruent with the 
habitus of the other groups, it was never able to realize all of its aspirations.  Frickel observes that “a 
series of subtle and no-so-subtle shifts in emphasis seem to have weakened genetic toxicology’s initial 
environmental thrust” (Frickel 2004: 140).  While genetic toxicologists framed their work as 
indispensable to other research areas, those other areas have been less welcoming than genetic 
toxicologists had hoped. These other research areas occupy their own unique of position among the 
intellectual landscape of specialties, and produce dispositions defined by their own methods, theories, 
and objects of study that only partly overlap with the habitus defined by genetic toxicology.  The 
relationship of genetic toxicology to cancer research is an excellent example of incongruent positions 
and dispositions.  One of the research areas to which genetic toxicologists spent much effort 
proselytizing is that of cancer.  Genetic toxicologists framed carcinogens as chemical mutagens, 
attempting to shift the center of gravity in cancer research to issues pertinent to genetic toxicology.  
However, cancer researchers held different views about what the most pressing questions in their 
specialty are.  While genetic toxicologists thought cancer research should focus on the chemical causes 
of genetic abnormalities, cancer researchers have continued to lay emphasis on the mechanisms of 
cancer pathology, rather than focus on mutagenesis. Incongruence such as the one described here is not 
particular to genetic toxicology.  All scientific specialties are aware of how what they do can improve 
other lines of research; the difficulty lies in convincing the scientists in other specialties that this is so.  
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The very act of participating in a specialized research program creates biases unique to that program. 
Finally, the habitus associated with genetic toxicology was oriented toward changing the scientific 
field.  Genetic toxicologists did not simply reproduce the scientific field by acting in accordance with 
their habitus, they sought to change it through additional research and building a stronger relationship 
with social and environmental policy makers.  This change implied a reorganization of the field in which 
research devoted to studying individual chemicals for their mutagenic effects would be the primary 
currency of scientific capital, while research devoted to studying basic genetic processes would no 
longer be valued as highly.  The habitus associated with genetic toxicology called for scientists topursue 
a more extensive understanding of chemical mutagensand a wider range of applications to public health.  
Many of the changes called for by the genetic toxicology habitus came to fruition.  As Frickel notes,  
In less than a decade, the chemical mutagens that geneticists had once used exclusively as 
tools in experimental research gained new meaning as environmental problems, and a new 
interdiscipline emerged to claim ‘environmental mutagenesis’ as its central topic. These 
transformations changed the way genetics knowledgewas made and who made it.  They also 
changed how environmental health specialists and policy makers interpreted the human 
consequences of chemical pollution (2004: 135). 
 
This orientation towards change is not unique to genetic toxicology; it is part of the scientific ethos 
generally.  The pursuit of new problems and avenues of inquiry is an institutional dimension of scientific 
activity (Merton 1968), and so the scientific field remains in constant flux. 
Because the habitus associated with genetic toxicology was a consequence of its relationship to other 
relevant groups, was incongruent with the total intellectual landscape, and was change oriented, it fits 
Mannheim’s definition of a utopian ideology.  And by defining it as such, it enriches our understanding 
of Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus as it is applied to the scientific field. I have argued that the concept 
of the scientific habitus has suffered from two major shortcomings:  1) the scientific field is made up of 
clusters of specializations which are shaped by interactions with each other, and the habitus does not 
account for these mesolevel interactions; 2) it can only account for reproduction of the scientific field 
and therefore ignores the mechanisms which produce change. I have attempted to remedy these 
shortcomings by examining Scott Frickel’s work on genetic toxicologists through a Mannheimian lens.  I 
have illustrated how the scientific habitus is constructed with reference to scientific specialties.  The 
habitus associated with genetic toxicology was particular to those scientists’ experiences with chemical 
mutagenesis and the environmental movement, and was not necessarily congruent with the habitus of 
other research specialties such as cancer.  This observation allows us a more nuanced interpretation of 
the habitus.  Analyses of the habitus in science ought to account for the localized experiences of 
particular research specialties.   
I have also argued that change can be incorporated directly into Bourdieu’s field theory if the habitus 
is characterized as utopian, i.e., if it has a mechanism built into it that calls for a constant reappraisal of 
the field. From the utopian perspective, changes in the structure of a scientific specialty’s specific field 
are a consequence of the guiding and motivational elements of the utopia. In the case of genetic 
toxicology, the habitus provided a vision of what was to be done, and the scientists acted on that vision, 
changing the field in the process. 
Although it is seldom acknowledged, Karl Mannheim and Pierre Bourdieu share fundamental views 
on the relation between social position and knowledge.  Bourdieu argued that social positions determine 
the tastes an individual will have, and these tastes, when put into practice, tend to have the effect of 
reproducing the social order.  In the field of science, these tastes manifest as preferences for particular 
kinds of questions, methods, materials, and styles of doing research.  The Mannheimian position is that 
the social positions of groups determine their overall thought structures.  This paper has attempted to 
reconcile these theorists by showing that Bourdieu’s field theory can be enhanced by a Mannheimian 
perspective. 
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